Big difference I see is that everything seems a little puffy, rather than absolutely ridiculous prices on companies that clearly were never going to make any money, alongside relatively ridiculous prices on companies that were.
Funny, I was just reading this tidbit from one of Bernsteins old articles.
"Next, consider that the 100 largest stocks on the Nasdaq sell at a PE of 100. We’re talking now about approximately one-quarter of the capitalization of the U.S. stock market. The probability that this huge chunk of the economy will grow en bloc at 40% to 60% for the next five years is about the same as that of the Empire State Building spontaneously levitating to Beardstown by breakfast tomorrow.
A much more reasonable supposition is that the Nasdaq 100 sits at the far left end of the blue curve with earnings growth in the teens, yielding long-term bond-like returns accompanied by Ivana Trump-like volatility. There is nothing to prevent these shares from rising another 50% in the next year. But in the long run, the grim picture painted above is not idle conjecture or opinion. It is mathematical fact.
Finally, I want to be clear about one thing: the Asness model is wildly optimistic (as he himself admits). The real world decay of the most glamorous companies' earnings growth is breathtaking. In their landmark study of earnings growth persistence, Fuller, Huberts, and Levinson (Journal of Portfolio Management, Winter 1993) looked at stocks sorted by PE. They found that the top quintile¾ the most popular growth stocks¾ increased their earnings about 10% faster than the market in year one, 3% faster in year two, 2% faster in years three and four, and about 1% faster in years five and six. After that, their growth was the same as the market's. In other words, you can count on a growth stock increasing its earnings, on average, about 20% cumulatively more than the market over six years. After that, nothing.
Perhaps times have changed since the 1973-1990 period analyzed in the above-cited study. Let's be generous and assume that in the New Era the top quintile can manage a 50% cumulative growth advantage over the market. As I'm writing this, the top quintile of the 1,000 largest stocks with positive earnings sells at an average multiple of 78. A one-time 50% earnings growth advantage does not do much to justify such a valuation relative to the rest of the market (which sells at a PE of about 20).
It would seem, then, that a prerequisite for investing in the New Era is an inability or unwillingness to run the numbers. At some point in the not too distant future, we shall shake our heads and wonder how so many folks confused the forest with a gold mine."
The not-to-distant future turned out to be almost immediately after he wrote this article and published it.