donheff said:
I was sucked in by this BS at the time as was most of the country. To be fair to us, even Clinton believed it to be the case. He didn't understand that his bombing of Iraq (widely opposed by the republicans as a distraction from more important semen stained skirts) had completely destroyed Iraqs WMD infrastructure which was shaky at the time and never even started on the road back.
I'm not clear on what you think an NIE is. By definition it is a consensus view of the US intelligence community (IC). Here are the lead paragraphs from the "Key Judgements" of the Oct 2002 NIE:
"We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)
We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq’s WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad’s vigorous denial and deception efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs."
(In retrospect, that last sentence
definitely qualifies as an understatement!)
Only the Dept of State expressed an "alternative view." They believed Saddam had a limited program to develop nuclar weapons, but did not assess that the program was "integrated and comprehensive." They did not dissent concerning the CW and BW programs. Everyone agreed (and there is widespread agreement to this day) that Saddam had developed long-range missiles that were in violation of the UN limits. I wonder why he needed these? Perhaps to shoot off during Saddam Day celebrations? Or maybe as CW/BW delivery vehicles? Inquiring minds wanted to know.
You weren't "sucked in"--you were making the same assessment others were making based on what they/you knew. If you talked with people about Iraq's WMD at the time, were you "lieing", or just "mistaken?"
Here's a link to the released portion of the 2002 NIE "Key Findings."
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/nie-iraq-wmd.html#inr-n1
donheff said:
False. Only a few members had access to this info. The vast majority had access to only the public portions. Also, the members who did have access, had only what made it up to the NIE. The were not privy to the earlier discussions that were shut down.
Wrong in several respects. I said "prominent," not "many" There were both Republican and Democtartic members of the SSCI and the HPSCI. When leaders of the intel community testify before them (which is a very frequent occurance) the members can pose any questions they want--and get answers. John Kerry was a member of the SSCI until 2001.
These commitees have access to FAR more than just NIEs. Here's what they routinely receive (excerpted from a CRS report)
From the National Intelligence Community (NIC).
- National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) (20-30 page long reports)
- Intelligence Community Briefs (ICBs): estimative intelligence products that are formatted as six-page, quick-turn-around, analytic papers focusing on particular issues.
- Sense of Community Memos: one-page memoranda that evaluate current or day-to-day events. They are Community-coordinated and approved by the NIC chairman for dissemination.
- Conference Reports: Memoranda-for-the-record of conferences that the NIC sponsors on various topics. In addition to Intelligence Community personnel, participants can include experts from outside the Community.
From the CIA:
- The Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB): Known for decades as the National Intelligence Daily and viewed by the CIA as one of its flagship products, (44) is a daily publication containing six to eight relatively short articles or briefs covering an array of topics.
- Serial Fliers (SFs): Short and concise memorandum-style products, generally a few pages in length, on a discrete topic of current relevance. SFs generally do not contain summaries, but may contain graphics or maps.
- Intelligence Assessments (IAs): The primary vehicle for in-depth research.
- Strategic Perspective Series (SPSs), like IAs, are based on extensive research, but are focused on a key strategic issue - frequently at the direction of the Directorate of Intelligence leadership.
- Research Projects/Papers (RPs): Tthe primary vehicle used to explore new analytic research areas and to develop the Directorate of Intelligence's corporate knowledge of a given issue.
- Leadership Profiles (LPs): Biographic assessments of foreign leaders.
- Situation Reports: Short reports that comment on current, fast-breaking events. Up to two or three situation reports can be issued daily, if warranted.
Department of Defense.
- Military Intelligence Digest (MID) is produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency and is seen as a military-oriented counterpart to the SEIB.
I am NOT trying to say that it is reasonable that these lawmakers should have performed their own analysis and come to a different conclusion regarding Iraqi WMDs. But, they were aware of the of how the intel community was operating on this very important question. If the legislative branch is not going to accept some measure of responsibility for the failure of the intel community to get this right, then a reasonable person might ask what their function is, and whether their involvement in the process (at the cost of tons of meetings, staff papers produced for them, etc) is serving a useful function.
Now, I am concerned about reports that VP Cheney, together with a group of folks with which he has an ideological kinship, had a role in steering/shading the conclusions of the intel community and in reworking products until they were "suitable." We should all be concerned if/when any administartion cooks the books. For a good case history, look at what LBJ and Nixon did with the very solid assessments they got concerning the Vietnam situation, and the results of failing to see the world as it truly was. Do we need to beware of the same problem re: Iraq?
Yes.