SECTION_15: REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
This section creates an advanceable, refundable tax credit for the purchase of state-approved, major medical health insurance and unsubsidized COBRA coverage. To be eligible, generally, an individual must not have access to government health insurance programs or an offer from any employer; and be a citizen, national or qualified alien of the United States, and not incarcerated.
The credits are adjusted by age:
• Under age 30: $2,000
• Between 30 and 39: $2,500
• Between 40 and 49: $3,000
• Between 50 and 59: $3,500
• Over age 60: $4,000
The credits are additive for a family and capped at $14,000. The credits grow over time by CPI+1. The credits are available in full to those making $75,000 per year ($150,000 joint filers). The credit phases out by $100 for every $1,000 in income higher than those thresholds.
How would this compare to the ACA subsidies?
Did I read it correctly that the current ACA subsidies will stay in effect until 2020?
To encourage people to buy coverage, the plan allows insurers to charge a 30 percent penalty to people who let their insurance lapse, and then try to buy a new policy.
How would this compare to the ACA subsidies?
Not in the link... but in news report on the proposal:
How would this compare to the ACA subsidies?
As a retiree, I don't like thinking about such complicated issues.
The ACA makes one glad if they've reached 65 and gone on Medicare with a good supplement.
What I don't get is what this bill is going to cost (in billions of dollars). And will the number of insured actually go up, stay the same or be reduced for whatever reason?
The danger here is that young people with little savings and little to lose will forgo HI, wait for years, and enroll in a top shelf plan if they develop a serious chronic illness with a minuscule penalty -- the 30% if for one year. Unfortunately the resulting risk segregation could drive up premiums for all or drive more insurers out of the markets.Will the 30% penalty (along with the age-based tax subsidies) be as effective as the individual mandate to get the younger, healthier people to buy health insurance? Without enough of the younger, healthier people buying HI, premiums will be high, causing the healthier people in the system to drop out a.k.a. a death spiral.
Are age-based subsidies fairer than income-based subsidies? Younger people with lower incomes receive high subsidies today because of their income. They will receive lower subsidies under this proposal and give them more incentives to stop buying HI.
The danger here is that young people with little savings and little to lose will forgo HI, wait for years, and enroll in a top shelf plan if they develop a serious chronic illness with a minuscule penalty -- the 30% if for one year. Unfortunately the resulting risk segregation could drive up premiums for all or drive more insurers out of the markets.
The danger here is that young people with little savings and little to lose will forgo HI, wait for years, and enroll in a top shelf plan if they develop a serious chronic illness with a minuscule penalty -- the 30% if for one year. Unfortunately the resulting risk segregation could drive up premiums for all or drive more insurers out of the markets.