BRK for new money when Buffet is 88, Munger is 95

[pb4uski]

Concerns me that Buffet still does all the talking for company. If succession plan so solid, why not bring those folks out from behind curtain to built trust?

Also, Buffett recently said it takes a big acquisition to make it worth BRK’s time. With all the cash, easy for successor to make big mistakes. Think about GE doing deals to hit #’s, now selling to get back to growth profile.

Having spent over a decade in large scale M&A this would concern me greatly. I can't tell you how many times I saw CEOs or others in charge of acquisition decision-making "fall in love" with the deal and make stupid decisions as a result.... like adding highly questionable revenue or expense synergies to be able to offer a higher price to get to a deal rather than walking away.

 

[Cassius King]

Jain and Abel will be making the decision on acquisitions. They've already been doing it for years in Energy and Insurance. There will still be an amazing board intact, one that includes Bill Gates, et al.
It's not like once Warren passes that Berk will be run by clowns.

 

[ziggy29]

Having spent over a decade in large scale M&A this would concern me greatly. I can't tell you how many times I saw CEOs or others in charge of acquisition decision-making "fall in love" with the deal and make stupid decisions as a result.... like adding highly questionable revenue or expense synergies to be able to offer a higher price to get to a deal rather than walking away.

The good news here is that Berkshire doesn't play those Wall Street games. They don't provide "guidance" quarter to quarter to put pressure on "hitting their numbers" NOW. That means there is less pressure to make questionable deals just to satisfy Wall Street. As a long-term investor, that's one of the (many) things I like about Berkshire.

In fact, Buffett wrote about these practices in this year's annual report:

Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational,
induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an “innocent” fudge in order to
not disappoint “the Street” – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing
down a “cookie-jar” reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers “just this
once” may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy
for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.