If this had been an Air Force mishap, they would probably have a command-wide standdown and ground the fleet while investigations were ongoing and the crews were re-briefed on safety, procedures, etc. I suppose they can't standdown a slow-moving submarine fleet on duty all over the world, though.
When USS PORT ROYAL grounded on an Oahu reef last month, the surface fleet held a navigation & operations stand-down. They also sent their nav teams to the simulators and went through the usual checklists of discussion topics. Voyage planning, crew rest, risk management, forceful backup... I could practically deliver the day's curriculum in my sleep. The surface warriors on SailorBob.com are getting awful tired of the "everybody put your heads down on your desks" routine that's now perceived as a reflex response to every mishap.
[FireUp2025, now that you're wearing your bars I would strongly suggest that you go join that board and read a few pages of posts. It's far more valuable than any official training you'd receive. Even Tomcat, Deserat, & SamClem would enjoy the joint perspective.]
Last week I'm sure the submariners were walking around with little superior smirks on their faces, making snarky comments about feeling sorry for their Air Force brethren who couldn't handle a few measly nukes and then their SWO siblings who couldn't stay off an itty-bitty reef.
Not, of course, that I personally ever indulged in such behavior.
But this is such a horrific incident-- so close to losing the entire boat & crew-- that I bet the entire submarine force is canceling engineering drills for (*gasp*) not one but two days to focus on the issues and lessons. The pictures were bad enough, but the yet-to-be-unclassified details of how bad the collision really was are even scarier.
Don't get me wrong-- the standdown training is great stuff. The problem is that it's not being used as much as it needs to be used in the first place. What's bad about the safety-standdown concept is that there's so much other daily routine crap interfering with training that it takes multi-million-$$ groundings, injuries, and even deaths before everyone stops to focus on the fundamentals. When I was in charge of the fire & flooding trainers we could not even [-]bribe[/-] persuade the COs & XOs to send their damage-control teams more than once a year, and even then the right people wouldn't show up. One year we gave more training to the Japanese & Korean submarine crews than we gave to our own. Very few among the waterfront leadership came to their own realizations that this training was important enough to skip the daily meetings and admin-- they had to be cajoled, teased, and humiliated into it.
I was at training commands for nearly eight years as an instructor and several more cumulative years as a student. I've spent months of hours in shore simulators while on "sea duty". I was at the local submarine training command when USS GREENEVILLE killed Japanese fishermen & students through the CO's hubris and negligence. I spent weeks afterward working with our CO & XO on the investigations & reports, and for several more years I watched the effects of the casualty on over a dozen friends & shipmates. There was plenty of thoughtless stupidity happening during the events leading up to the collision, but what was even more frightening was the casual "we can do anything" attitude that the crew had picked up from the CO. Their faith in his leadership & skills was so strong that they discounted or even flat-out ignored several critical warning signs. Ironically if the GREENEVILLE CO had been an incompetent jerk or a screamer then his own crew would never would have let him give the orders that led to the sinking.
I could be wrong about the HARTFORD collision. It could've been the fault of the NEW ORLEANS or it could've been unavoidable. (Of course nukes are trained to never believe in the concept of "unavoidable".) Either vessel could have had an equipment failure or been maneuvering to avoid something even worse. But from the speed with which the CO was relieved, I suspect that the submarine leadership on the scene knew exactly what caused the problem and how to fix it. And, as is usually the case, I suspect that no new lessons were really learned.